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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ADONIS ROOER BURCH, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10408 
This is a criminal prosecution in which Ap-
pellant and one Kenneth Dale Hulse were jointly 
charged with burglary in the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury returned 
a verdict of "guilty". The court sentenced the Appel-
lant to the indeterminate term provided by law for 
the offense of burglary in the second degree and de· 
nied probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction as 
a matter of law or, failing that, a new trial or, failing 
that, a rehearing on the question of probation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 12:35 AM. on the morning 
of January 21, 1965, Appellant and Kenneth Dale 
Hulse were apprehended in the shop restrooms of 
Wheeler Machinery Company, in a crouched position, 
six to ten feet apart, with a walkie-talkie and a pair 
of brown work gloves about midway between them. 
(R. 84-89, 109-lll, ll9, 121). 
Two sledge hammers, a flashlight and a pinch 
bar were discovered in the same building in the 
office of the comptroller for the Wheeler Machinery 
Company. Plaster had been chipped from the wall 
separating the comptroller's office from thewalk-in 
vault leaving bricks exposed in the wall in a circular 
area about ten inches in diameter. There was dust 
and debris in the general area of the comptroller's 
office. (R. 52, 85). In addition, the glass part of the 
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door separating the comptroller's office from the 
outer accounting office was found to be broken. 
(R. 51, 58). 
The comptroller, Wren B. Egan, testified that 
the tools and debris had not been there, nor had the 
damage been done to the wall or the glass part of the 
door, when he left the office at approximately 5:30 
P.M. January 20, 1965. (R. 52-53). The custodian, 
Werner P. Christensen, testified that the tools, 
debris, dam age and broken window had not been there 
when he last checked the office at approximately 10:15 
P.M., January 20, 1965. (R. 77). 
Neither the comptroller nor the custodian tes-
tified that the defendants were not authorized to be 
in the Wheeler Machinery Building on the night in 
question or that the partial demolition of the wall 
was unauthorized except that the following evidence 
was given by the comptroller on direct examination: 
Q. Did anyone have any permission to go 
into your office after you left at approx-
imately 5 P.M. on the 20th of January, 
this year? 
A. The only one had permission would be 
the janitor who checks and cleans my 
office. 
Q. What is his name? 
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A. Werner Christensen. 
Q. You gave permission to no one else; is 
that correct? 
A. No, I did not. (R. 56). 
Jack Merrick, a contract night watchman who 
patrols the warehouse district, testified on direct 
examination that at approximately 12:30 A.M., Jan" 
uary 21, 1965, he entered the front door of the Wheel· 
er Machinery Building, heard pounding, called the 
police, circled around to the shop area and waited; 
that three men came running out of the office area 
into the shop area, that he yelled at them to stop. 
and when they didn't, he fired one shot at them; that 
two men ran into the shop restroom and that the third 
man disappeared in the shop area between the ma· 
chinery; that when the police came in the two de· 
fendants were apprehended in the shop restroom. 
(R. 80-88). 
On cross examination, the witness Merrick 
testified that he didn't actually see the men come 
through the doorway into the shop area (R. 90); that 
he fired the only shot at the men before the police 
arrived (R. 99); that the two men entered the restroom 
and that the police arrived about 30 seconds later. 
(R. 100). 
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Police Officer Lynn J. Lund testified that 
Merrick had let him into the shop area and that he 
was present when Merrick fired the shot; that Merrick 
did not yell at the men and tell them to stop. (R.115-
There is no direct evidence relating to the mode 
of entry into the building. The only circumstantial 
evidence adduced was Officer Edward Barton's tes-
timony, admitted over defendants' objection, that he 
had gained entrance by slipping the bolt of one of the 
outside doors with the blade of his pocket knife. 
(R. 126). The only other evidence relating to the mode 
of entry was the custodian's testimony that he checked 
the doors iust prior to leaving at 10:30 P.M., January 
20, 1965, rn. 77) and Officer Lund's testimony that 
he had investigated to determine the mode of entry 
and was unable to determine how entryhad been made. 
(R. 121-123). 
There was no direct evidence relating to the 
time of entry into the building. Circumstantial ev-
idence relating to the time of entry consists of the 
custodian's statement that when he left the building 
at approximately 10:30 P.M., January20, 1965, there 
was no one, to his knowledge, in the area of the 
Wheeler Machinery Company. (R. 78); the description 
by the comptroller, custodian and night watchman of 
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the size (approximately the length of a football field 
both ways. R. 62-63); character(several departments 
with individual rooms separated by doors. R. 39-47, 
62, 65-68, 72-73); character of business conducted 
inside the building (heavy equipment being repaired, 
large parts, shelves and bins, etc. R 39-47,62,65· 
68, 72-73), the fact that nothing was apparently 
broken, damaged, or forced to gain entry; and the 
amount of damage done to the wall separating the 
comptroller's office from the vault. 
There was no direct evidence relating to the 
intent, if any, of the defendants at the time they gained 
entrance to the building. The circumstantial evidence 
consisted of testimony that there was some damage 
done to the outer wall of the walk-in vault, although 
it is not clear from the evidence whether or not there 
were any valuables inside the vault at the time the 
damage was done; that the defendants were present 
in the building after business hours, although there is 
no evidence that they were not authorized to be 
present at that time; and that they ran when confronted 
by Officer Merrick, although there is some evidence 
that Officer Merrick opened fire on them without 
warning. 
At the close of the State's evidence, defendants 
made a motion to dismiss the information for insuf-
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ficiency of the evidence, which motion was denied, 
and the defendants rested. 
The jury was instructed and after deliberation, 
returned verdicts of "guilty" against both defendants. 
The defendant , Adonis Roger Burch, waived the 
statutory time within which he must be sentenced and 
requested that the court order a pre-sentence report 
from the State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
On May 17, 1965, defendant, Adonis Roger Burch, 
was sentenced to the Utah state Prison for the inde-
terminate term as provided by law for the crime of 
burglary in the second degree and his request for 
probation was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE INFORMATION IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF 
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah guarantees that an accused has the 
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, state vs. Topham, 41 Utah 
39, 123 Pac. 888. 
The information charges the Appellant with 
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burglary in the second degree in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 9, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
as follows to-wit: 
That on or about the 20th day of January 
1965, at the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, the said ADONIS ROGER BURCH 
entered the building of Wheeler Machine~y 
Company, a corporation, in the night-time 
with intent to commit larceny therem, 
Section 73~9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
provides that a burglar is one 
... who in the night-time forcibly breaks and 
enters or without force enters an open door. 
window, or other aperture of any,.. building 
... w!J:h intent tocomm.!_tlarceny or anyfelon1 
... L emphasis added_} 
The information neither charges that defendan1 
forcibly broke and entered the building of the Wheeler 
Machinery Company nor does it charge that the de· 
fendants, without force, entered through an open door. 
window or other aperture of the building of Wheeler 
Machinery Company. 
Moreover, the information does not accuse the 
defendants by using the name given to the offense by 
the common law or by a statute as required by Section 
77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, noris it couched 
in thetermspermittedbySection 77-21-47, UtahCo~ 
Annotated, 1953. The information fails to meet the 
standard of notice required by constitutional or 
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statutory law to support the conviction. 
POINT IL THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT THAT THE APPELLANT ISGUILTY 
OF BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
The evidence upon which Appellant's conviction 
is based is insufficient in that it fails to establish 
( 1) the mode of entry, ( 2 ) the time of entry and ( 3) 
the intent of the Appellant at the time of entry. 
The common law definition of burglary required 
a breaking and entering. 12C.J.S. 669, 673,Burglary 
Sec. 3, 10. The Utah statute has expanded the defini-
tion of burglary to include, in addition to breaking 
and entering, entry, without force, through an open 
door, window or other aperture. 76-9-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The Information upon whichAppel-
lant stands convicted charges only that the defendant 
"entered" the building. 
Defendant Burch's Demand for Bill of Particu-
lars served on the district attorney requested an-
swers to the following questions: 
1. State whether it is contended by the pros-
ecution that the defendant, Adonis Roger 
Burch, broke into the building of Wheeler 
Machinery Company. 
*** 
3. State whether it is contended by the pros-
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ecution that said Adonis Boger Burch unlaw. 
fully entered the building of Wheeler Ma-
chinery Company. 
4. If the answer to the previous question is 
yes, state when, where, and how. (R. 2) 
To the foregoing questions, the district attorney 
responded with a Supplemental Answer to Defendants' 
Demand for Bill of Particulars which answered as 
follows: 
1. No. The state does not contend that the 
defendant "broke" into the Wheeler Ma-
chinery Company in the sense that there was 
any physical damage to the victim's property 
caused by this defendant at the time of entry. 
However, the state does contend that the de-
fendant entered illegally. 
3. Yes. 
4. The specific entrance by which said de· 
fendant unlawfully entered the building of 
Wheeler Machinery is unknown to the State. 
However, he unlawfully entered the building 
at 330 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
sometime after sunset on January 20, 1965. 
and prior to 12:40 A.M. on January 21,1965. 
( R. 5 ). 
The Defendant Hulse served a Demand for Bill 
of Particulars upon the district attorney which de· 
manded an answer to the following: 
*** 
7. By what means does the State contend 
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the defendants entered the Wheeler Machin-
ery Company? ( R. 7 ). 
To which the District Attorney answered: 
*** 
7. The State will prove the defendants en-
tered the building by unlawful means, but 
the exact means used and the exact point 
of entry is unknown to the State. ( R. 8). 
The prosecution is required by law to plead 
and prove that entry was gained by one of two 
methods: 
1. By forcibly breaking and enteringthe build-
ing; or 
2. Without force, by entering through an open 
door, window, or other aperture. 
The prosecution by the use of the particular 
words contained in the Information, and by its answer 
to paragraph 1 of defendant Burch's Demand for Bill 
of Particulars, apparently based its case, and limited 
its evidence, on the theory that the defendants entered 
the building without force through an open door, win-
dow, or other aperture. 
The evidence is totally void of any reference 
as to which, how, or even that an open door, window, 
or other aperture was entered and the prosecution 
has admitted in its Bill of Particulars that it does 
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not know the mode of entry. ( R. 5, 8 ). Mere 
presence in the building is not sufficient. The mode 
of entry must be established. State ys. Tromim:, 
123 Wash. 514, 232 Pac. 326; People vs. Burns, 114 
C.A. (2d) 566, 250 P. (2d) 619; State ys. Sewell. 49 
Wash. (2d) 244, 299 P. (2d) 570; State vs Gruba~, 
54 N.M. 272, 221 P. (2d)l055;Stateys Owen. 94Ariz. 
354, 385 P. (2d) 227. It has not been established. 
It is required that the prosecution show by 
affirmative proof that the entry was made duringthe 
nighttime. 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, 
State vs. Miller. 24 Utah 32, 67 Pac. 790. 
Nighttime is defined as the period between 
sunset and sunrise. 76-9-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
The evidence neither establishes when the entry 
was made, nor when nighttime began, that is when 
the sun set. 
There were two abortive attempts to stipulate, 
and to get the court to take judicial notice as to 
when the sun set on January 20, 1965. (R.69-70, 
132, 133). Neither resulted in a stipulation or in the 
establishment of the time by judicial notice, norwas 
the jury instructed that there had been a stipulation 
or judicial notice as to when the sun set. Moreover, 
there was no competent admissible evidence regard· 
12 
ing what time the sun set on January 20, although 
counsel for the other defendant did state in open 
court that he was informed that the sun set at 5:31 
p M. on January 20, 1965. Such statement is not 
competent evidence for the reason that it is based 
on hearsay, and for the further reason that it was 
not given under oath. 
There was no direct evidence tending to show 
when the building was entered. The only circum-
stantial evidence adduced on the question was the 
custodian's testimony that when he left at approxi-
mately 10:30 P.M. on January 20, 1965, there was 
no one, to his knowledge, in the area of the Wheeler 
Machinery Company. (R. 78). 
When circumstantial evidence of this character 
is considered, together with the fact that the rmd e 
of entry is not shown, that the building is very large 
in size, and presumably abounds in places where a 
person can be present and undiscovered, the limited 
scope of the custodian's activities, and the limited 
opportunity of the custodian to know whether someone 
else was present prior to his leaving (R. 77-78), it 
can be readily seen that the evidence is as consistent 
with entry in the daytime as in the nighttime. The 
time of entry has not been established. 
Under the Code and consistent with the plead-
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ings, the prosecution is obliged to prove that at the 
time of the entry, the defendant intended to commt l. 
a larceny in the building. 76-9-3, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. State vs. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 27~ 
Pac. 950. 
Again the prosecution has failed to adduce any 
direct evidence as to intent at the time of entry. By 
way of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution's 
evidence showed that a hole had been started in the 
wall of the vault, and that when the night watchma.1 
accosted the suspects they ran. The effect of this 
latter bit of evidence is somewhat dulled by Officer 
Lund's testimony that the nightwatchrnan fired atthe 
defendants without warning. Further, it must be re· 
membered that neither of the representatives o! 
1 
Wheeler Machinery Company, nor any of the othe' , 
witnesses, testified that the defendants were not 
authorized to be in the building. The prosecution 
is required to show by direct, affirmative evidence 
that the suspects did not have authority to be in the 
building. 12 C.J.S. 734, Burglary, Sec. 57. 
It is submitted that the effect of the circum· 
stantial evidence relating to intent adduced by the 
prosecution is further dulled by the prosecution's 
inability to show the mode or time of entry. §!$ ' 
vs. Owen, 94 Ariz. 354, 385 P. (2d) 227. 
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POINT IIL THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS EDWARD BAR-
TON TO TESTIFY REGARDING HOW HE ENTERED 
THE BUILDING. 
Edward Barton, a detective on the Salt Lake 
City Police Department was permitted to testify, 
over Appellant's objection, that he had gained en-
trance to the building by slipping a bolt on one of the 
doors with the blade of his pocket knife. (R. 125, 
126). 
In effect, Detective Barton testified that hehad 
conducted an experiment, out of court, to determine 
how entry of the building had been accomplished. 
Such testimony is inadmissible first, because 
it does not relate to an issue before the court, and 
second, because it is not shown that conditions were 
the same. 
The information does not charge the defendants 
with breaking and entering the building of Wheeler 
Machinery Company. It merely alleges that defen-
dants unlawfully entered the building. Moreover, 
the prosecution, in its Bill of Particulars, apparently 
disclaims any contention that there was a breaking 
and entering, which there would have been had entry 
been gained in the manner described by the witness. 
Evidence of an experiment conducted out of 
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court is not admissible unless it is shown to be 1 
relevant to an issue properly before the court. Jones 
--..;.: 
on Evidence, 2nd Edition, pp. 156, 515f, Sec.139, 410. 
Even if the proferred evidence had been relevant 
to one of the issues there is no showing that the de· ' 
fondants gained entry in the manner described or 
through the door indicated or through any door or 
that the conditions were the same. Evidence of an 
experiment conducted out of court is not admissible 
unless it is shown that conditions were the same. 
Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition, pp. 156, 515f, Secs. 
139, 410. 
To permit the jury to hear such testimony was 
to suggest that the missing elements of the offense 
had been proven, and in addition, reflected on ap-
pellant's character, all of which was, necessarily, 
1 
highly prejudicial to the defendant. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
The court instructed the jury by instruction 
No. 4-A: 
You are instructed under the evidence 
presented in this case, and the law per· 
taining to this case, that Second Deg~ee 
Burglary is the wtlawful, forcible breaking 
and entering, or the unlawful entry thro~h 
an open door, or window, without force, 10 
1 
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the nighttime, with intent to commit larceny 
therein. 
"'Nighttime" means the period between 
sunset and sunrise. 
"Larceny" is the felonious taking of 
personal property of another. 
"Felonious taking" means with intent 
to permanently de,£rive the owner of pos-
session thereof. L emphasis addedJ 
and_by instruction No. 4-B: 
Before you can convict a defendant of 
Burglary in the Second Degree, you must 
believe from the evidence, and be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of the 
following elements are true: 
I 1 I that the defendant being considered 
by you, on or about the 21st day of 
January, 1965, in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, unlawfully en-
tered the building of Wheeler Ma-
chinery Company; 
(2) that said entry, if any, was accom-
plished by forcibly breaking or en-
tering, or by entering through an 
open door, window or other aper-
ture, or by opening a door or window; 
(3) that the defendant being considered 
by you at the time of said entry, if 
any, intended to commit larceny in 
sai.d building; 
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( 4) t~at s.aid entry, if any, was in the 
mghttime. (R.14) femphasis added] 
Use of the word "unlawful" in two places of 
the description of Second Degree Burglary as con· 
tained in Instruction No. 4-A is error. Not only is 
it meaningless, separate and apart from the other 
aspects of the entry, and, therefore surplusage 
but it tends to detract from the requirement that tht 
jury find that there was a forcible breaking and en· 
tering, or without force, an entry through an open 
door, window or other aperture, and in so doing tends 
to confuse the jury. Moreover, by following the er· 
roneous form of the information, the use of the term 
"unlawful entry" constitutes an indication by the 
Court of inclination toward the prosecutor's case 
and is prejudicial. state vs. Harris, 1 U. (2d) 182, 
264 P. (2d) 284; Mikell, Clark's Criminal Procedure, 
2nd Edition, pp. 548f, Sec. 174-176. It necessarily 
follows, therefore, that the use of term "unlawfully 
entered" in subparagraph (1) of Instruction No. 4-B 
is objectionable and prejudicial on the same ground. 
By adding the phrase "or by opening a door or 
window;" to the rest of subparagraph (2). the Court 
not only restated a principle established in the same 
sentence, but also, by using those particular words, 
did so in a manner tantamount to a comment on the 
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9vidence, and thereby committed grievous prejudi-
cial error. State vs. Green, 77 Utah 580, 590, 6 P. 
(2d) 177; State vs. Thompson, 110 Utahll3,170 P. (2d) 
153, Mikell. Clark's Criminal Procedure, 2nd Edition, 
p. 549, Sec. 174-176. 
In addition, Appellant contends that the set of 
instructions given by the court, where it does not 
include instructions as to the included offenses of 
Third Degree Burglary and Unlawful Entry with 
Intent to Do Damage, Injure or Annoy, ignores the 
defendants' theory of the case which theory is con-
sistent with and supported by the evidence, and is 
erroneous. State vs. Johnson, ll2 Utah 130, 185P. (2d) 
738; People vs. Carmen (Cal.) 228 P. (2d) 281; Mikell, 
Clark's Criminal Procedure, 2nd Edition, pp. 550f, 
Sec. 174-176. This contention will be more fully 
~reated under Point V. 
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
Defendants requested that the court instruct the 
jury as follows: 
INSTRUCTION 1 
You are instructed that the gravamen of 
Second Burglarly in [Sic] the forceful 
breaking and entering or without force the 
entering of open doors, windows or other 
19 
aperature LsicJ of the establishment ai· 
leged in the information. 
Thus l-if_7 the State has failed toprovt 
to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonablt 
doubt that the defendants entered theestah .. 
lishment forcefully or without force enter~r 
8:!! ope_!). door, window, or other aperature 
l sic_/ of the establishment, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. (R. 10). 
INSTRUCTION 2 
You are instructed that when in the 
proseCJ:ttion for Burglarly in SecondDegree 
L sic_/ the question as to whethertheentf) 
has been committed in the nighttime or 11 1 
the daytime cannot be found beyond area.· 
sonable doubt you are instructed that aver· 
diet of third degree may be found provided 
that you are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the other elements of the crime 
of Burglarly l-sic _7 are proved by the State 
(R. 11). 
INSTRUCTION 3 
You are instructed that the crime of un· 
lawful entry with the intent to do damage is 
an included offense of the crime of Second 
Burglarly l sic_7. Before you can find th~ 
defendants guilty of the included off®S_e 0~ 
unlawful entry, you must find the l sic_, 
each and every element as follows: 
(1) That the defendants unlawfully 
entered the building of Wheeler 
Machinery Corp. 
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(2) That the defendants had at the 
time of said entry the intent to do 
damage. 
( 3) That the above acts occurred in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Before you can convict the defendants of 
the crime of unlawful entry, you must find 
to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the above. If the State has 
failed to satisfy your minds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, you must find the defendants 
not guilty. (R. 12), 
All three requested instructions were refused 
by the court 
Defendants' requested instruction No. 1 de-
scribes, rn essentially the same words as those con-
Uuned m Ser:tion 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
the acts sufficient to constitute a necessary element 
of the offense, and as was seen under Point IV of the 
ugu.men~ the trial court's instructions given under 
4-A. and 4-B were inadequate in this regard. 
The court's refusal to give requested instruc-
i:ions numbered 2 and 3 is error. Both instructions 
deal with the included offenses of Third Degree Bur-
glary and Unlawful Entry. The defendants' strategy 
was based upon the presumption of innocence and the 
included offenses. People vs. Carmen,(Cal.) 228 P. 
(2d) 281. 
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Section 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, Mi 
provides in part: 
.... When in a prosecution for burglary 
the Second Degree the question as towheth' 
the crime has been committed in the nigh;. 
time or in the daytime cannot be definiM 
arrived at by the jury, a verdict of guil~ 
of burglary in the third degree, as defined 1, 
Section 76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated,!%! 
may be found; provided the other elementi 
of the crime of burglary inthethirddegn:e, 
as defined in said Section 76-9-5, UtahCode 
Annotated, 1953, have been proved. 
Neither the time of entry nor the time the sun 
set was established at the trial by director circurn· 
stantial evidence. The deficiency of the evidence 
in this regard is more fully discussed under Point 
II. The defendants' theory of the case was that the 
entry, if any, was made in the daytime, or at least 
that the prosecution failed to prove that the entry wa1 
made in the nighttime. The circumstantial evidence, 
such as it is, bearing on the time of entry is as con· 
sistent with the defendants' theory that the entry 
was made in the daytime as that entry was made in 
the nighttime. Defendants' requested instruction Ne. 
2 almost word for word follows the provisions of 
Section 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the 
court should have granted it. State vs. Millg, 24 
Utah 32, 67 Pac. 790; Mikell, Clark's Crimi~ 
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Procedure, 2nd Edition, pp. 550f Secs. 174-176. 
Section 76-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides that: 
Every person who unlawfully enters any 
building or part of any building, room, ware-
house, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, 
or other building or any tent, vessel, water-
craft, railroad car, automobile, automobile 
trailer, aeroplane or aircraft with the intent 
to damage property or to injure apersonor 
annoy the peace and quiet of any occupant 
therein is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The evidence adduced at the trial showed that a 
glass part of an inside door had been broken and that 
a part ofaninsidewallhadbeendamaged. There was 
no evidenci:; that anything had been taken or stolen 
from Wheeler Machinery Company. Indeed, the dis-
trict attorney in response to demand no. 4 contained 
in defendant Hulse' Demand for Bill of Particulars, 
to-wit: "was anything taken from the Wheeler Ma-
chrnery Company? If so, itemize all said items.", 
answered "No." (R. 7, 8). 
Granted, the wall was the wall of a walk-in vault 
but the prosecution's witness, Wren D. Egan, testi-
fied that entry to the vault could have been gained by 
turning the dial and openingthedoorandthat with the 
exception of the contents of a safe of unknown descrip-
tion contained in the vault, there was no evidence that 
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the vault contained anything particularly valuable 
(R. 41-42). 
The foregoing consists of circumstantial evi-
dence consistent with the proposition that entry haa 
been gained with the intent to damage property rather 
than with the intent to commit larceny inside the 
building. Defendants' strategy was based upon this 
theory and there was substantial evidence tosuppol". 
it. Defendants' requested instruction No. 3 shoull 
have been given. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PROBATION TO APPELLANT. 
On the basis of the pre-sentence report pre· 
pared by the Utah state Department of Adult Pro-
bation and Parole, which report defendant is not 
permitted to see, the Court refused to grant pro· 
bation to the Appellant. While it is conceded that 
the trial court has very broad discretion in the 
question of whether or not to admit a particular 
defendant to probation, that is not to say that the 
court may take into account, in determining which 
way to exercise that discretion, evidence from 
witnesses without affording such defendant the right 
to confront such witnesses. It is possible that 
Appellant could have explained such evidence to the 
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satisfaction of the trial court and persuaded the 
trial court to exercise its discretion to a contrary 
result. 
To withhold from Appellant the opportunity to 
confront the witnesses and hear the evidence against 
him and to have an opportunity to meet and rebut 
such evidence is very prejudicial to Appellant and is 
repugnant to Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah and to the 6th and 14th Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States of 
America and is contrary to the standard of fair play 
envisaged by the due process clauses of the Constitu-
tions of the State of Utah and of the United states of 
America. Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of the 
State of Utah; 5th and 14th Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the United States of America. 
CONCLUSION 
The defect in the pleading, the insufficiency of 
the evidence, and the error of the trial court in (1) 
admitting the testimony of Edward Barton, (2) giving 
rnstructions 4-A and 4-B to the jury, (3) failing to 
instruct the jury with regard to included offenses, 
and ( 4) refusing to give defendants' requested in8truc-
tions all and individually warrant reversal of the low-
er court and thus setting aside, as a matter of law, 
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the conviction of the Appellant. 
The failure by the trial court to make the pre· 
sentence report available to the defendant requires 
that this court reverse the trial court's order deny· 
ing probation and the remanding of the case fora 
rehearing on that question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES F. HOUSLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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